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SECTION 351 TRANSFERS TO CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS: THE FORGOTTEN TERM-
"SECURITIES"
Tax advisors dealing with a transfer of property to a controlled cor-
poration'- often find themselves in a quandary, for although there have
been many cases in this area, no clear rule has evolved for deciding whether
a given transfer is governed by the nonrecognition provisions of section
351. This situation has come about because courts generally use an analysis
that forecloses consideration of an important issue raised by the statute.
The Tax Court's recent handling of these cases 2 illustrates this approach
and its defects.
A dispute between the Commissioner and the corporation over the
latter's proper basis in the transferred property often raises the question
of the applicability of section 351. If a transfer is governed by section 351,
the basis to the corporation is the same basis that the property had in the
hands of the transferor; 3 whereas if the transfer is not governed by section
351, the basis to the corporation is its cost.4 When the property is depre-
ciable, the Commissioner often disallows part of the corporation's deprecia-
tion deduction, contending that the proper basis was that of the transferor
and not the cost. Charles E. Curry 5 demonstrates the advantages that
can result from the exclusion of a transfer of depreciable property from
section 351. 6
In Curry, four adult members of a family transferred income produc-
ing real property to a corporation controlled partly by two of the transferors
1 
IxT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 351(a) :
No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to a corporation
by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock or securities in such
corporation and immediately after the exchange such persons are in control
* * . of the corporation.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(c), defines "control" as:
[T]he ownership of stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent
of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation.
A provision similar to section 351, except for minor variations, has been in every
revenue act since 1921.
2 E.g., Arthur M. Rosenthal, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1373 (1965); Charles E.
Curry, 43 T.C. 667 (1965), acq., 1965 INT. Rxv. BULL. No. 38, at 4; Burr Oaks Corp.,
43 T.C. 635 (1965).
a INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 362(a).
4 See INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 1012. The cost of the property will ordinarily
be the fair market value of what the corporation gives up for it. In the absence of
a readily ascertainable market value for what the corporation gives up, the cost will
be the fair market value of the transferred property. United States v. Davis, 370
U.S. 65, 72-73 (1962).
-543 T.C. 667 (1965), acq., 1965 INT. REv. BuIu. No. 38, at 4.
6 But see INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1239, 1245, 1250, which mitigate the benefits
gained by transferring depreciable property to a corporation at a stepped up basis.
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and partly by a related third person. There had been prior negotiations
with an outside party. The final terms were basically similar to those
offered by the outsider. The transferors received a small cash down pay-
ment and took a first and a second mortgage on the property.8 No restric-
tions were placed on the right to alienate the corporation's shares, and in
fact by the time of trial one of the shareholders had transferred his shares
to an unrelated third party.
Judge Forrester, in a decision reviewed by the court, rejected the
Commissioner's contention that the transaction was governed by section
351, holding instead that the transfer constituted a "sale" 9 and that section
351 does not apply to "sales." 10 The effect of this decision was to allow
the corporation to use a 1,400,000 dollar basis on which to take depreciation
rather than the 85,000 dollar basis of the transferors.
Even when the transferred property is not depreciable, the question of
the proper basis to the corporation is often disputed. In Burr Oaks Corp.,:1
three individuals who owned a tract of land with a low basis and a high
market value transferred it to a new corporation they had organized. The
corporation was to subdivide and improve the land and sell it in lots.'2 The
stockholders of the corporation were the wives and brothers of the three
transferors and had nothing to do with its operation. In payment for the
land each transferor received a two year promissory note bearing six per-
cent interest. During 1959 each received payments from the corporation
on the notes. At maturity the notes were extended, and at the time of the
trial still had not been paid in full.
Judge Fay, in a decision reviewed by the court, held that the transfer
of the land to the corporation was a capital contribution rather than a sale
and that the promissory notes given to the transferors in return repre-
sented preferred stock.' 3 He went on to hold the transaction governed by
section 351, and that therefore, the corporation took the transferors' basis
in the property.' 4 The corporation's taxable income was increased by the
7 The shares before and after the transfer were apportioned as follows:







8 Principal payments on the second mortgage were not scheduled to begin until
the first mortgage was satisfied. In addition principal payments on the second mort-
gage could be waived if the cash flow from the property was not equal to the sum
of cash expenses, payments on the first mortgage, capital expenditures and taxes.
9 43 T.C. at 695.
10 Id. at 697. ,
1143 T.C. 635 (1965).
12 This factual situation is a common one. See, e.g., Bruce v. Knox, 180 F.
Supp. 907 (D. Minn. 1960); Aqualane Shores, Inc., 30 T.C. 519 (1958), aff'd, 269
F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1959).
13 43 T.C. at 649.
14 Id. at 651.
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amount its basis in the property was reduced; 15 the transferors were denied
capital gains treatment on the sale of the land to the corporation, and their
basis for the corporate stock became the same as their basis had been in the
exchanged property.'
A related issue often present in these cases is the proper treatment to
be given the amounts paid to the transferors on the notes they were given
in exchange for the transferred property. The Commissioner often dis-
allows the corporation's interest deduction, contending that the notes
represent capital contributions and the payments, dividends. 7 If the Com-
missioner prevails, not only is the corporation denied its deduction, but the
individual transferors must pay tax on the "dividends" that they had hoped
would be treated as tax free principal. This issue, commonly known as the
debt-equity issue, arises in many areas of the Code and can hardly be
characterized as unique to section 351 cases., Its determination requires
a factual evaluation of all relevant circumstances to see whether the sub-
stance of the debt instrument upholds its form.'
9
In handling these cases the courts usually fail to separate the debt-
equity and nonrecognition issues. The Commissioner usually attempts to
have the transfer classified as a capital contribution because the corpora-
tion would then be denied both its interest deduction and a stepped up
basis. If he is successful, the debt will be "stock" for purposes of section
351.20 On the other hand, the corporation's goal is to have the transfer
classified as a "sale" 21 because the courts do not apply section 351 to
"sales." 2 When a court frames the issue in terms of whether a transfer
is a "sale" as opposed to a "capital contribution," it is considering the debt-
equity issue and the issue of the applicability of section 351 simultaneously,
and is thereby foreclosing the possibility of finding the debt valid but the
transaction nevertheless within section 351.
The courts rely on a number of criteria in determining whether a
transfer is a "sale." When a transfer is held to be a capital contribution
15 The corporation's basis was reduced from the claimed $360,000 to $100,000, and
when all the lots have been sold its taxable income will have been increased by the
$260,000 difference.
36 INT. RtV. CODE OF 1954, § 358(a).
'7 See, e.g., Castle Heights, Inc. v. United States, 242 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Tenn.
1965); Bruce v. Knox, 180 F. Supp. 907 (D. Minn. 1960); Burr Oaks Corp., 43
T.C. 635 (1965).
Is See Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, 17 N.Y.U. INST. ON
FED. TAx 771, 811 n.198 (1959). See generally Goldstein, Corporate Indebtedness to
Shareholders: "Thin Capitalization" and Related Problems, 16 TAX. L. REv. 1 (1960).
'9 See Gooding _Amusement Co., 23 T.C. 408, 418 (1954), aff'd, 236 F.2d 159
(6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957).
20 Burr Oaks Corp., 43 T.C. 635, 649, 651 (1965).
21 See Charles E. Curry, 43 T.C. 667 (1965), acq., 1965 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 38,
at 4; Evwalt Dev. Corp., 22 CCH Tax Ct Mem. 220 (1963); J. I. Morgan, Inc., 30
T.C. 881 (1958), acq., 1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 4; Ainslie Perrault, 25 T.C. 439 (1955),
acq., 1956-1 Cum. BuLL. 5.
22Arthur M. Rosenthal, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 1373, 1383 n.4 (1965) ; Charles
E. Curry, supra note 21; see Evwalt Dev. Corp., supra note 21; 3. I. Morgan, Inc.,
supra note 21; Harry F. Shannon, 29 T.C. 702 (1958); Ainslie Perrault, supra
note 21.
SECTION 351 TRANSFERS
rather than a sale, three factors are most likely to be emphasized. The first
is whether the corporation is undercapitalized. Although undercapitaliza-
tion alone cannot be determinative,2 3 the courts still consider it.24
The second factor-variously referred to as "risk of the business" or
"anticipated source of payments"-concerns the source of the funds neces-
sary to pay off the corporate debt obligations. Where the transferred
property is undeveloped and constitutes the corporation's only significant
asset, the payment of the notes is completely dependent upon the success-
ful development of the property. In these cases the courts tend to view
the debt obligations as representing a continuing equity interest in the
transferred property.2 5 In contrast, when the property already produces
sufficient income to cover payments on the notes, the courts are less likely
to stress this factor,2 6 although theoretically the payment of the notes is
dependent upon the future success of the business.
The third criterion-whether the parties intended to create a bona
fide debtor-creditor relationship-is based on a judgment of whether the
transferor would enforce the notes if they were not paid, even though en-
forcement would weaken the corporation's financial position.2 7 In cases
where payments were missed and the transferors took no action,28 the
determination of the intent question is easier than in cases where the notes
have always been paid on time. In the latter cases the court must infer
the parties' intent.
When the court finds the transferors had a "valid business purpose"
for "selling" rather than making a capital contribution, the transfer is likely
to be excluded from section 351 regardless of what other factors are
23 See Estate of Miller v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956). A number
of cases have held a transfer to be a sale despite a high debt-equity ratio. E.g., Sun
Properties, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1955) (ratio of 310:1);
J. I. Morgan, Inc., 30 T.C. 881 (1958), acq., 1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 4 (ratio of 50:1).
Compare Caplin, supra note 18, at 777-84, which tells of the complete reliance on the
ratio test in the period 1946-1956.
2 4 E.g., Bruce v. Knox, 180 F. Supp. 907, 912 (D. Minn. 1960); Burr Oaks
Corp., 43 T.C. 635, 646 (1965) ; Marsan Realty Corp., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1513,
1523 (1963).
2See Aqualane Shores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1959);
Castle Heights, Inc. v. United States, 242 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Tenn. 1965) ; Bruce v.
Knox, supra note 24; Burr Oaks Corp., supra note 24; Daro Corp., 20 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1588 (1961).
26 See Charles E. Curry, 43 T.C. 667 (1965), acq., 1965 INT. Rxv. BuLL. No. 38,
at 4; Aqualane Shores, Inc. v. Commissioner, vipra note 25, at 120 (dictum). Buit
see Marsan Realty Corp., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1513 (1963). For cases where
the court has found a "sale," stressing that the transferred property was not at the
risk of the business, see J. I. Morgan, Inc., 30 T.C. 881, 891 (1958), acq., 1959-1
Cum. BULL. 4; Warren H. Brown, 27 T.C. 27, 33 (1956), acq., 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 4.
27 Gooding Amusement Co., 23 T.C. 408, 418 (1954), aff'd, 236 F.2d 159 (6th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957).
28 See Marsan Realty Corp., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1513 (1963) ; cf. R. M. Gunn,
25 T.C. 424 (1955), aff'd per curiant sub norn. Perrault v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d
408 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 830 (1957). In Gunm when the Commissioner
asserted that the payments on the "notes" were really dividends the corporation
stopped making payments in order to avoid further tax if it lost the case. The court
noted this stoppage in finding an intent not to enforce payment of the notes.
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present.2 9 For example, the Tax Court found a valid business purpose
where the transferor sold equipment to the corporation because a capital
contribution in return for stock would have greatly diluted the equity
interests of his two business partners and held that section 351 did not
apply.30 In other cases where a "sale" is upheld the court is likely to
stress the intent of the parties to make a "sale." 81
Although these criteria are relevant to deciding the debt-equity issue,
by themselves they are not suited for determining the applicability of sec-
tion 351 to a given transfer. To begin with, they do not accord with the
language of the section. Of course since equity is stock within section 351,
the solution of the debt-equity issue does bear to some extent upon the
section 351 problem; but even where the debt is valid, the transfer may
come within the section's "securities" provision. Further, the debt-equity
criteria do not reflect the underlying policy of section 351. That policy was
clearly expressed by Judge Magruder twenty-five years ago:
It is the purpose of [section 351] . . . to save the taxpayer
from an immediate recognition of a gain, or to intermit the claim
of a loss, in certain transactions where gain or loss may have
accrued in a constitutional sense, but where in a popular and
economic sense there has been a mere change in the form of
ownership and the taxpayer has not really "cashed-in" on the
theoretical gain or closed out a losing venture. . . . "The trans-
action described in the statute lacks a distinguishing characteristic
of a sale, in that, instead of the transaction having the effect of
terminating or extinguishing the beneficial interests of the trans-
ferors in the transferred property, after the consummation of the
transaction the transferors continue to be beneficially interested in
the transferred property and have dominion over it by virtue of
their control of the new corporate owner of it." a
2
The legislative history - and other cases 34 accord with this expression of
the section's policy.
29 See Estate of Miller v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956), reversing
24 T.C. 923 (1955) (to continue business after impending death of one of three
partners); Warren H. Brown, 27 T.C. 27 (1956), acq., 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 4 (to
settle dispute over expansion between two partners).
30J. I. Morgan, Inc., 30 T.C. 881 (1958), acq., 1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 4.
31 See Evwalt Dev. Corp., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 220 (1963); Harry F. Shan-
non, 29 T.C. 702 (1958).
.32 Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479, 488 (1st Cir.) (quoting Ameri-
can Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Bender, 70 F.2d 655, 657 (5th Cir. 1934)), cert.
denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940).
33 See S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1921), in 1939-1 Cum. BuLr.
188-89. The 1954 Code made no change in the basic purpose of the section. See
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A116 (1954).
34 Cf. Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 1959);
Trenton Cotton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 33, 36 (6th Cir. 1945); Clyde
Bacon, Inc., 4 T.C. 1107, 1117 (1945).
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The determination of the "sale" issue does not and can not answer
the question of the applicability of section 351. Its use by the courts, there-
fore, is improper. Its effect is to foreclose consideration of an important
issue raised by the statuory language: Whether the transfer was made "in
exchange for stock or securities" of the corporation.
In Campbell v. Carter Foundation Prod. Co.8 5 the Fifth Circuit con-
sidered the debt-equity and section 351 issues separately. In that case a
tax exempt foundation transferred income-producing property to a cor-
poration of which it was the sole stockholder for the purpose of avoiding
the tax on unrelated business income3 6 In return for the property the
foundation received a small cash payment and eleven promissory notes
which matured over the following five years. Deciding the debt-equity
issue first, the court found the corporate notes to represent valid indebted-
ness and the interest paid thereon to be deductible 3 7 The court then pro-
ceeded to consider whether section 351 was applicable, stating the issue as
"whether businessmen acting with all honor and sincerity have, or have
not, set up a transaction which tax law regards as 'stock' or 'securities.' "38
The court then concluded that even though there was a valid business
reason for the transfer, no rearrangement of beneficial ownership had taken
place, and in the final analysis economic ownership remained the same.8 9
It therefore found the transfer to be within section 351 even though the
debt was valid. In addition to separating the two issues, the court avoided
the use of the term "sale" and its tendency to divert the court's attention
from the proper issue.
If, like Carter, the courts did not use the "sale" analysis, they would
have to decide whether valid debt instruments were "securities" for pur-
poses of section 351. Although the term "securities" is not defined in sec-
tion 351, it has the same meaning there that it has under the reorganiza-
tion provisions of the Code.4 °
The scope of that meaning was first outlined in Pinellas Ice & Cold
Storage Co. v. Commissioner4 where the Supreme Court held that short
term notes were not "securities" on the theory that the notes were
equivalent to cash and that the tax free reorganization provision did not
apply to cash transactions.Y2 Even though this holding is arguably wrong,
43
it seems to be well embedded in the tax law.44
35 322 F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1963).
36 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 512.
87 322 F2d at 832.
38 Id. at 833.
39 Id. at 835.
40 Lloyd-Smith v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 642, 644 (2d Cir. 1941) ; Camp Wolters
Enterprises, Inc., 22 T.C. 737, 751 (1954), aff'd, 230 F.2d 555 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 826 (1956). For the reorganization provisions, see INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 354-95.
41287 U.S. 462 (1933).
42 Id. at 469 (alternative holding).
43 See Griswold, "Securities" and "Continuity of Interest," 58 HARv. L. REV. 705,
706-12, 718-25 (1945). Griswold also states that the decision has led the courts to
restrict unduly the scope of the term "securities." Id. at 719.
44 Id. at 722-23.
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From Pinellas two separate tests developed for deciding whether a
given instrument was a "security"-its term and its name. The im-
portance of the term of the instrument follows naturally from the rationale
of Pinellas. The rule of thumb was that instruments payable in five years
or less did not qualify as "securities" while those for ten years or more
qualified. The Commissioner's position was that notes of less than four
years did not qualify as "securities." 4" However, that ruling was with-
drawn 47 in line with his new policy of not issuing advance rulings on
whether debt instruments are "stock" or "securities" for purposes of
section 35L 48
The second factor relied on by the courts was the name given to the
debt instrument by the parties. It was thought that "notes" did not qualify
as "securities." 49 The dichotomy between notes on the one hand and
bonds and debentures on the other had little basis in the case decisions 0
The distinction is fortunately no longer used by the courts.51 One kind of
instrument in which the name may remain important is the "installment
sales contract." The Tax Court in Warren H. Brown 52 held that a contract
calling for ten annual installments with interest on the unpaid balance was
not a "security" because "the installment contract in question was not in-
tended to insure the partners a continued participation in the business of
the transferee corporation, but was intended rather to effect a termination
of such continuing interest." - The decision does not seem to be valid.
There are no economic differences between a long term installment sales
agreement and a formal long term corporate debenture that should lead
to different tax consequences under section 351. The holders of both
instruments will have a "continuing interest" in the affairs of the corpora-
tion for the duration of the term. The only difference is the amount of
the interest and that is not relevant to defining "securities." Furthermore,
under the court's theory, no debt that was being amortized could qualify
as a "security" regardless of the length of its term. In any event, Brown
is the only case holding installment sales contracts not to be "securities."
45 See Camp Wolters Enterprises, Inc., 22 T.C. 737, 751 (1954) ; BiTrTx, FED-
ERAL INcomE TAXATION OF CORORATIONs AND SHAREHODERs 82 (1959); Comment,
16 U. MiAmI L. REv. 434, 445 (1962).
4 6 Rev. Rul. 56-303, 1956-2 Cum. Bui.. 193.
47 Rev. Rul. 63-28, 1963-1 Cum. BuLL. 76.
48 Rev. Proc. 62-32, § 4.015, 1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 527, 532.
49 See Griswold, supra note 43, at 719; Weiss, Notes as Securities Within Sec-
tion 112(b)(3), 26 TAxEs 228 (1948).
50 See id. at 228-30. Compare L & E Stirn, Inc. v. Commissioner, 107 F.2d 390
(2d Cir. 1939) (bonds held not to be securities), with Burnham v. Commissioner,
86 F.2d 776 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 683 (1936) (notes held to be securities).
51 See Camp Wolters Enterprises, Inc., 22 T.C. 737, 750-51 (1954). Bittker
questions the need for any formal instrument in a close corporation, contending that
the corporation's promise on open account has the same meaning to the shareholder
as a bond or note. Brrirx, op. cit. supra note 45, at 104.
5227 T.C. 27 (1956), acq., 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 4.
53 Id. at 36.
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The current test used by the courts was announced by the Tax Court
in Camp Wolters Enterprises, Inc.5' where five to nine year subordinated
notes were held to be "securities" within section 351:
The test . . . is not a mechanical determination of the time
period of the note. Though time is an important factor, the con-
trolling consideration is an over-all evaluation of the nature of the
debt, degree of participation and continuing interest in the busi-
ness, the extent of proprietary interest compared with the simi-
larity of the note to a cash payment, the purposes of the advances,
etc.5
Since the courts so rarely reach the "securities" issue, and since the
only case since Camp Wolters to consider it thoroughly was the incorrectly
decided Brown case, it is not clear how the test will operate as compared
to the term test. It is probable that the new test will treat short term debt
of the Pinellas type and long term debt in the same manner as before. The
holding in Camp Wolters suggests that debt falling within these two ex-
tremes will more likely be classified as "securities" under the new test than
they were under the old term test.
This general test will probably be used to decide most of the cases
that arise. However, other factors may be employed in solving specific
problems as, for example, where an individual 56 transfers property to a
corporation of which he is the sole shareholder in exchange for debt instru-
ments of the corporation. On these facts the court in the Carter case 7
held the transfer to be within section 351 without specifying whether the
notes were "stock" or "securities." 58 Although the court's finding that
the debt was valid59 seems to indicate that the notes were "securities,"
its express refusal to categorize them at all may mean that it was not con-
cerned about an exact classification. This would not be inexplicable, since
the policy of section 351 applies to all cases where, because the transferor
is the sole shareholder of the corporation, it is impossible to have a shift
in beneficial ownership.
The beneficial ownership test, however, works only in cases like Carter
where it is literally impossible to have a change in beneficial ownership. 0
Otherwise, the reasoning behind its application would become circular,
since the extent of beneficial ownership is measured by ownership of "stock"
or "securities": section 351 is inapplicable only if there is a genuine re-
6
4 22 T.C. 737 (1954).
55 Id. at 751.
56 The transferor-shareholder could also be a group. See Arthur M. Rosenthal,
24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1373 (1965).
67 Campbell v. Carter Foundation Prod. Co., 322 F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1963).
68 Id. at 833-35.
G9 Id. at 831.
0 Curry would have been such a case except that the court found as a fact that
the parties, despite their family relationship, had dealt with each other at "arms
length." Charles E. Curry, 43 T.C. 667, 687 (1965), acq., 1965 Ixr. Rxv. BuLL.
No. 38, at 4.
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arrangement of beneficial interest, but there is a genuine rearrangement of
beneficial ownership only if the notes are not "securities." Thus in Curry,
when the Tax Court held section 351 inapplicable because of the dispropor-
tion between stock and note ownership,01 it held by implication that the
notes were not "securities." The issue the court said it did not have to
decide 0 2 was therefore the key to the correctness of its decision.
There were two promissory notes issued by the transferee corporation
to the transferors in Curry. The first was for ten years, secured by a
first mortgage and provided for equal semi-annual principal payments plus
interest on the unpaid balance. 2 The second note, secured by a second
mortgage, required semi-annual interest payments on the unpaid balance
with principal payments to start in the eleventh year and to continue for
ten years in equal annual installments.64 There was also a waiver clause
on second mortgage principal payments under certain circumstances. 5
Considering the twenty year length of the second note, the absence
of principal payments for ten years, and the waiver clause, the note should
be classified as a "security." 86 The first mortgage note is harder to
classify. On its face it is very similar to the installment sales contract
which Brown held not to be a "security." But even assuming that Brown
is right,67 Curry is distinguishable because the continued subordination of
payments to other expenditures 6 tends to show that the instrument evi-
denced a "continuing interest" in the corporation's business.
Curry illustrates the danger the "sale" analysis presents to the proper
handling of section 351 cases. In that case the "sale" approach led to
the wrong result. These problems could be avoided if the courts would
consider the cases in light of the issues raised by the statutory language
of section 351 rather than by looking for a "sale."
81 See ibid.
62 Id. at 697.
63 Id. at 677.
84 Id. at 698.
65 See note 8 supra.
66 See Camp Wolters Enterprises, Inc., 22 T.C. 737, 751 (1954).
67 For a contrary view, see text at p. 320 supra.
a Charles E. Curry, 43 T.C. 667, 683 (1965), acq., 1965 INT. REv. Bu.L. No.
38, at 4.
[Vo1.114:314
